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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
David John Harper appeals from the judgment of the district court, entered upon 
the jury verdict finding him guilty of Trafficking in Marijuana.  On appeal, Harper claims 
the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 Corporal Chris Cottrell of the Idaho State Police stopped Harper for following 
another vehicle too closely, in violation of I.C. § 49-638(1).  (R., pp. 68-69.)  Officer 
Cottrell observed Harper driving at approximately 65 miles per hour while only about 1.5 
car lengths behind another vehicle.  (Id.)  When Officer Cottrell approached Harper’s 
vehicle he smelled the “immediate and strong” odor of marijuana.  (Id.)  A drug detecting 
canine altered to the presence of drugs.  (Id.)  Officer Cottrell searched Harper’s vehicle 
and found boxes loaded with packages of marijuana.  (Id.)  Harper had 31 individually 
wrapped packages of marijuana weighing approximately 17.38 pounds.  (Id.)   
The state charged Harper with Trafficking in Marijuana.  (R., pp. 29-30.)  Harper 
filed a motion to suppress alleging that Officer Cottrell lacked reasonable suspicion for 
the stop and that I.C. § 49-638, the statute prohibiting following too closely, is void for 
vagueness and unconstitutional.  (R., pp. 33-34, 37-41, 62-63.)   
Officer Cottrell testified at the hearing on Harper’s motion to suppress.  (R., pp. 
66-67.)  Officer Cottrell testified that he observed Harper’s vehicle “following another 
white pickup truck very closely.”  (6/13/16 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 24.)  Officer Cottrell estimated 
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that Harper was following the white pickup by only “one-and-a-half car lengths.”  
(6/13/16 Tr., p. 4, L. 25 – p. 5, L. 3.)  
Q. Okay. And you said he was following too closely. Why did you 
think that he was following too closely? 
 
A. At their speed, roughly 65 miles an hour, they’re traveling at right 
around 95 feet per second.  So from my training and experience the 
average reaction time for the average person is about one to one-and-a-half 
seconds. That’s the perception/reaction time. So in that one-and-a-half 
seconds they’re going to travel anywhere from 95 to 140 feet. 
 
Q. Okay. So let’s break this down so we’re using the same units of 
measurement. How far in feet do you think one-and-a-half car lengths is? 
 
A. That’s roughly -- I put a car length at about 20 feet, so it’s about 
30, 35 feet. 
 
Q. Okay. So at that speed you said 95 feet per second. I’m going to 
ask you to do a little math if you can for us. If he’s following 30, 35 feet, 
how long in seconds would it take to travel the following distance? Does 
that make sense? 
 
A. Yes. It’s going to take less than a half second. 
 
(6/13/16 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 4-25.)  Officer Cottrell testified that, based upon his training, the 
average reaction time for a driver is “one-and-a-half seconds.”  (6/13/16 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 1-
19.)  Officer Cottrell watched Harper follow too closely to make sure it was not a “fluke” 
and eventually pulled in behind him.  (6/13/16 Tr., p. 7, L. 8 – p. 9, L. 21.)  Officer 
Cottrell has “pretty regularly” made stops for driving too closely and, based upon his 
training and experience, Harper was following too closely.  (Id.)   
 The district court entered a written order denying Harper’s motion to suppress.  
(R., pp. 68-76.)  The district court found Idaho Code § 49-638(1) provided Harper with 
fair notice that his conduct was prohibited.  (R., p. 73.)  The district court also found that 
Harper failed to prove the statute gave police unbridled discretion in determining whether 
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to arrest.  (R., pp. 73-74.)  The district court found that Officer Cottrell had reasonable 
articulable suspicion to stop Harper for following too closely in violation of Idaho Code § 
49-638(1).  (R., pp. 74-75.)   
Here, Officer Cottrell testified Harper was driving 65 mph (95 feet per 
second) and keeping a mere distance of about 1.5 car lengths (30-35 feet) 
between himself and the vehicle he was following.  As previously noted, 
he also testified his training and experience has taught him the average 
person has a reaction time of about 1 to 1.5 seconds, during which time the 
average driver will travel from between 95 and 140 feet.   
 
(R., p. 75.)  The district court cited two non-binding decisions that supported its finding 
that Officer Cottrell had reasonable suspicion to believe Harper was following too 
closely.  (R., p. 75 (citing United States v. Rosales, 2006 WL 120053, at *3 (D. Idaho 
Jan. 12, 2006) (officer had reasonable suspicion driver violated I.C. § 49-638 where 
driver followed another vehicle at a distance of 1-2 car lengths for approximately 1-2 
minutes at 70-72 mph); State v. Lloyd, 2010 WL 3723207 (First Judicial Dist. Idaho, 
2010) (was reasonable to stop defendant for following at one car length while traveling at 
50 mph, the defendant should have kept a distance of three car lengths).   
The case proceeded to jury trial.  (R., pp. 84-101.)  The jury found Harper guilty 
of Trafficking in Marijuana.  (R., p. 106.)  The district court entered judgment and 
sentenced Harper to three years fixed.  (R., pp. 133-134.)  Harper timely appealed.  (R., 





Harper states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Harper’s motion to suppress?   
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
 Has Harper failed to show the district court erred when it denied his motion to 









Harper challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that Idaho Code 
§ 49-638(1), following too closely, is void for vagueness.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-
14.)  Contrary to Harper’s argument, Idaho Code § 49-638(1) is not void for vagueness 
and other jurisdictions reviewing similar statutes have repeatedly found that they are not 
unconstitutionally vague.  Further, even if Idaho Code § 49-638(1) is void for vagueness, 
United States Supreme Court precedent holds that suppression is not proper. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a decision on 
a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings of 
fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of 
constitutional principles to those facts.  State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 
1240, 1242 (2006). 
 Whether a statute is unconstitutional is purely a question of law, therefore, the 
appellate court considers the trial court’s ruling de novo.  State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 
969 P.2d 244 (1998) (citing State v. Hansen, 125 Idaho 927, 930, 877 P.2d 898, 901 
(1994); Sun Valley Co. v. City of Sun Valley, 109 Idaho 424, 428, 708 P.2d 147, 151 
(1985)).  “There is a strong presumption of the validity of an ordinance, and an appellate 
court is obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds its constitutionality.  
Id. (citations omitted). A statute should not be held void for uncertainty if any practical 
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interpretation can be given it.  Id. (citing City of Lewiston v. Mathewson, 78 Idaho 347, 
351, 303 P.2d 680, 682 (1956)).   
 
C. The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Harper’s Motion To Suppress  
 
“A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants and 
implicates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”  State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)).  Ordinarily, a warrantless seizure must be 
based on probable cause to be reasonable.  Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 
(1983); State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009).  
However, limited investigatory detentions, based on less than probable cause, are 
permissible when justified by an officer’s reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person 
has committed, or is about to commit, a crime.  Royer, 460 U.S. at 498; Bishop, 146 
Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210.  “An officer may also stop a vehicle to investigate 
possible criminal behavior if there is reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle is 
being driven contrary to traffic laws.”  Young, 144 Idaho at 648, 167 P.3d at 785 (citing 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)).  Whether an officer possessed reasonable 
suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or 
before the time of the stop.  Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210; State v. Sheldon, 
139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003).   
Officer Cottrell stopped Harper because he had reasonable articulable suspicion 
that Harper was following another car too closely, a violation of Idaho Code § 49-638(1).   
(See R., pp. 68-69.)  On appeal, Harper does not argue that Officer Cottrell lacked 
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reasonable articulable suspicion that he was following too closely, but instead contends 
the district court should have granted his motion to suppress because Idaho Code § 49-
638(1) is unconstitutionally vague.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-14.)  Harper’s argument 
fails.  Idaho Code § 49-638(1) is not unconstitutionally vague, and even if it is, 
suppression is not the proper remedy.  
1. Idaho Code § 49-638(1) Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague As Applied To 
Harper’s Conduct 
 
In determining whether a statute is void for vagueness the court must first ask 
whether it regulates constitutionally protected conduct.  State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 587-
588, 798 P.2d 43, 46-47 (1990).  Harper does not argue, nor could he establish, that Idaho 
Code § 49-638(1) regulates constitutionally protected conduct.  (See Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 7-14.)  Since the statute does not regulate constitutionally protected conduct the “next 
and last step is to ask whether (a) the ordinance gives notice to those who are subject to it, 
and (b) whether the ordinance contains guidelines and imposes sufficient discretion on 
those who must enforce the ordinance.”  Bitt, 118 Idaho at 588, 798 P.2d at 47.  
The United States Supreme Court has explained that “[a] conviction or 
punishment fails to comply with due process if the statute or regulation under which it is 
obtained ‘fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is 
prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory 
enforcement.’”  F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) 
(quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)).  Statutes have a “strong 
presumption of validity” and the court must, if it can, “construe, not condemn” them.  
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 403 (2010) (internal quotes and cites omitted).  
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That “close cases can be envisioned” is insufficient to “render[] a statute vague” because 
the state must still prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.  United States v. Williams, 
553 U.S. 285, 305-306 (2008).  Even if a statute’s “outermost boundaries” are 
“imprecise,” such uncertainty has “little relevance” if the “appellant’s conduct falls 
squarely within the ‘hard core’ of the statute’s proscriptions.”  Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 
413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973); see also Skilling, 561 U.S. at 411 (citing Broadrick).  
Furthermore, sufficient clarity “may be supplied by judicial gloss on an otherwise 
uncertain statute.”  United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997).  “‘One to whose 
conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.’”  
Alcohol Beverage Control v. Boyd, 148 Idaho 944, 949, 231 P.3d 1041, 1046 (2010) 
(quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 
n. 7 (1982) (internal quote omitted)).   
“In order to determine whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague, the statute 
should not be evaluated in the abstract, but should be considered in reference to the 
particular conduct of the defendant challenging the statute.”  State v. Hansen, 125 Idaho 
927, 932, 877 P.2d 898, 903 (1994) (citing State v. Marek, 112 Idaho 860, 866, 736 P.2d 
1314, 1320 (1987); State v. Carringer, 95 Idaho 929, 930, 523 P.2d 532, 533 (1974)).  
Thus, “the void-for-vagueness doctrine addresses concerns about (1) fair notice and (2) 
arbitrary and discriminatory prosecutions.”  Skilling, 561 U.S. at 412 (2010) (citing 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).  Here, Harper fails to establish that I.C. 
§ 49-638(1) is unconstitutionally vague because he has failed to show either that: 1) the 
statute did not give him fair notice of the prohibited conduct; or 2) the statute grants 
unlimited discretion to police. 
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a. Idaho Code § 49-638(1) Provides Fair Notice That Harper’s 
Conduct Was Prohibited  
 
Idaho Code § 49-638(1) – Following too closely, states: 
 
(1) The driver of a vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely 
than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of the 
vehicle, the traffic upon and the condition of the highway. 
 
I.C. § 49-638(1).  The district court concluded this statute provides fair notice because a 
“reasonably intelligent person” could determine whether he or she was following another 
vehicle too closely, also known as “tailgating.”  (R., p. 73.)  
As previously stated, to avoid violating I.C. § 49-638(1), one should 
refrain from following another vehicle “more closely than is reasonable 
and prudent, having due regard for the speed of the vehicle, the traffic 
upon and the condition of the highway.”  In this Court’s opinion, a 
reasonably intelligent person could form an idea about what subsection (1) 
of the statute proscribes: do not “tailgate” another vehicle under any 
circumstance; if the weather makes it difficult for a driver to see, that 
driver should follow another vehicle at a greater distance than it would if it 
were a dry, cloudy day; be aware of traffic flow; etc.  
 
More specifically, Harper has failed to show that he himself was void of 
adequate notice.  The law allows a statute to hold a driver criminally liable 
of a public welfare offense where the driver acted with ordinary 
negligence.  As a consequence, Harper is lawfully required to drive as a 
reasonably prudent person and decipher whether he is following another 
vehicle too closely.  Accordingly, Harper failed to show I.C. § 49-638(1) 
fails under the first prong of the analysis.   
 
(R., p. 73.)  The district court was correct.  
 
 Even if Idaho Code § 49-638 contains some uncertainty, that uncertainty is of 
“little relevance” because Harper’s conduct falls within the “hard core” of the statute’s 
proscriptions.  Idaho Code § 49-638 proscribes following another vehicle “more closely 
than is reasonable and prudent” while considering speed, traffic and the conditions of the 
highway.  See I.C. § 49-638(1).   
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Here, Officer Cottrell testified Harper was driving 65 mph (95 feet per 
second) and keeping a mere distance of about 1.5 car lengths (30-35 feet) 
between himself and the vehicle he was following. 
 
(R., p. 75)  A person has an average reaction time of 1 to 1.5 seconds during which the 
average driver will travel between 95 and 140 feet before stopping.  (Id.)  If it takes 95 to 
140 feet to stop – following another vehicle at a distance of 30-35 feet – is not 
“reasonable and prudent.”  Harper was driving way too close to the vehicle in front of 
him.  Harper’s conduct falls within the “hard core” of the statute’s proscriptions.   
Because the statute clearly provides notice, and Harper’s own conduct falls 
squarely within, Harper cannot show the statute is vague.  On appeal, Harper argues that 
Idaho Code § 49-638(1) did not give him adequate notice because the statute “does not 
specify at what distance following another vehicle becomes following ‘more closely than 
is reasonable and prudent.’”  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)  He argues that drivers are 
“‘left to do the guesswork as to what would be illegal at any given point in time given the 
circumstances of traffic.’”  (Id. (quoting R., pp. 39-40).)  Harper’s argument fails. 
 Idaho Code § 49-638(1) prohibits following another car more closely than is 
“reasonable and prudent.”  I.C. § 49-638(1).  While Idaho law does not appear to have 
directly addressed the constitutionality of the “reasonable and prudent” language, similar 
state statutes “have been uniformly upheld against constitutional challenges.”  See United 
States v. Hunter, 663 F.3d 1136, 1142 (10th Cir. 2011).  Hunter was stopped for violating 
Kansas Statute § 8-1523(a), which states: 
The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely 
than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such 




Id. at 1141 (citing K.S.A. § 8-1523(a)).  Hunter argued this statute was unconstitutionally 
vague as applied to his conduct “because the term ‘reasonable and prudent’ is too 
subjective to inform ordinary drivers as to its meaning, and the statute does not establish 
minimum standards to guard against discriminatory enforcement.”  Id.  The district court 
and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected his argument.  Id. at 1141-1142.  The 
Tenth Circuit found that similar “reasonable and prudent” statutes have been found to be 
constitutional: 
Mr. Hunter cites no authority on point in support of his position. On the 
other hand, as the district court and the government both emphasize, 
identical or very similar “reasonable and prudent” standard statutes are 
ubiquitous throughout the United States, and have been uniformly upheld 
against constitutional challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Mendez–Cejas, 
2009 WL 914873, at *4 (D.Nev. Jan. 15, 2009), aff’d, 2009 WL 961464 
(D.Nev. April 2, 2009); United States v. Johnson, 2006 WL 435975, at 
**3–4 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 21, 2006), aff’d, 258 Fed.Appx. 510 (4th Cir. 
2007); Smith v. State, 237 So.2d 139 (Fla.1970); United States v. 
Marmolejo, 2007 WL 915195 (S.D. Ohio 2007); State v. Coppes, 247 
Iowa 1057, 78 N.W.2d 10 (1956); State v. Shapiro, 751 So.2d 337, 341–42 
(La.Ct.App. 1999); State v. Giovengo, 692 So.2d 462 (La.Ct.App. 1997); 
State v. Heid, 50 Misc.2d 409, 270 N.Y.S.2d 474 (N.Y.Cnty.Ct. 1966); 
State v. Quinones, 2003 WL 22939467, at **4–5 (Oh.Ct.App. 2003); State 
v. Bush, 182 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio Com.Pl. 1962); State v. Harton, 108 S.W.3d 
253, 260 (Tenn.Crim.App. 2002); Logan City v. Carlsen, 585 P.2d 449 
(Ut.1978). 
 
Id. at 1142; see also Nolan v. State, 182 So.3d 484, 492-494 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) 
(providing recent list of jurisdictions that have upheld “tailgating” statutes containing the 
same “reasonable and prudent” language).  The Tenth Circuit went on to explain that the 
“reasonable and prudent” statutes provide needed flexibility while maintaining easily 
understood standards.  Id.  
As these cases make clear, imprecision in statutes such as the one here 
simply build in needed flexibility while incorporating a comprehensible, 
normative standard easily understood by the ordinary driver, and giving 
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fair warning as to what conduct on his or her part is prohibited. Further, 
references in these statutes to considerations such as speed, traffic and 
road conditions, channel enforcement. 
 
Id. (footnote omitted).  
A statute gives adequate notice when it gives a “person of ordinary intelligence” 
fair notice of what activity is prohibited.  See State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 
P.2d 244, 246 (1998) (citing Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)).  In 
Bitt, supra, the ordinance prohibited loitering or prowling “in a place at a time or in a 
manner not usual for law-abiding individuals.”  Bitt, 118 Idaho at 589, 798 P.2d at 48.  
“Such loitering or prowling must ‘warrant alarm for the safety of persons or property.’”  
Id.  The Idaho Supreme Court held this language gave sufficient notice to those who 
wished to avoid violating the ordinance.  Id.  “We are certain that a reasonably intelligent 
individual could, if pressed, be able to form some idea of what sort of conduct the 
ordinance proscribes, and that may be sufficient.”  Id.  Here, Idaho Code § 49-638(1) 
prohibits a driver from following another vehicle more closely than is “reasonable and 
prudent” considering the circumstances.  As other jurisdictions have repeatedly found, a 
reasonably intelligent individual could form some idea of what it means to follow another 
vehicle more closely than is “reasonable and prudent.”  Harper has failed to establish that 
Idaho Code § 49-638(1) failed to give him adequate notice his behavior was prohibited.   
b. Idaho Code § 49-638(1) Does Not Authorize Or Encourage 
Arbitrary And Discriminatory Enforcement  
 
 Along with providing fair notice, Idaho Code § 49-638(1) also provides sufficient 
guidelines for law enforcement.  The district court determined that Idaho Code § 49-
638(1) does not vest complete discretion in law enforcement because the Idaho Driver’s 
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Education Manual recommends a safe following distance of three seconds, and Officer 
Cottrell testified regarding safe following distances.  (See R., pp. 73-74.)   
Unlike the ordinance in Bitt, the statute at issue here does not vest 
complete discretion in law enforcement officers.  As asserted by the State, 
the Idaho Driver’s Education Manual recommends a minimum of three 
second following distance, a standard Officer Cottrell testified to being 
familiar with.  Moreover, Officer Cottrell testified that his training and 
experience shows the average person has a reaction time of about 1 to 1.5 
seconds, during which time the average driver will travel from between 95 
and 140 feet if going 65 mph.  These statistics may lawfully and 
effectively guide an officer in determining whether one vehicle is 
following another too closely.  Harper argues following another vehicle at 
a distance of 1.5 vehicles while going 65 mph is a “typical distance for 
many areas of highway in many parts of the nation.”  However Harper fails 
to support that claim with any facts or authority.  Consequently, I.C. § 49-
638(1) is not void for vagueness and it does not grant law enforcement 
officers unbridled discretion.  
 
(R. p. 74 (italics added).)   
Citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983), Harper argues that the 
“recommendations from the driver’s manual, or factoids from police training, cannot 
serve as guidelines because they were not set by the Idaho Legislature as part of Section 
49-638(1).”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 13.)  Harper argues that to pass constitutional muster 
the statute would need to include language specifically setting forth the three-second 
following rule or other specific following distances.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-14.)  
Harper is incorrect.   
A following too closely statute employing a “reasonable and prudent” standard 
does not need to include such specific calculations to pass constitutional muster.  See, 
e.g., Hunter, 663 F.3d at 1142 (list of jurisdictions finding “reasonable and prudent” 
language to be constitutional); Nolan, 182 So.3d at 492-494 (same); see also State v. 
Gonzalez, 539 N.E.2d 641, 643 (Ohio App. 1987) (holding that statute prohibiting 
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following another vehicle “more closely than is reasonable and prudent” was not 
unconstitutionally vague because absolute mathematical certainty is not required in a 
statute).   
Nor does Kolender help Harper’s argument.  In Kolender, Lawson challenged the 
constitutionality of California Penal Code § 647(e), which “require[d] that an individual 
provide ‘credible and reliable’ identification when requested by a police officer who has 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify a Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968)] detention.”  Kolender, 461 U.S. at 356.  The United States Supreme Court first 
expressed a concern regarding the constitutionally of the statute “based upon the 
‘potential for arbitrarily suppressing First Amendment liberties.’”  Id. at 358 (citing 
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 91 (1965)).  The Court also explained 
that the statute contained “no standard for determining what a suspect has to do in order 
to satisfy the requirement to provide a ‘credible and reliable’ identification” and thus, 
vested the police with “virtually complete discretion” to determine whether the statute has 
been violated.  Id.   
The language “reasonable and prudent” distance for driving a car, unlike “credible 
and reliable” standard for identification, provides guidelines to the officers.  Following a 
car more closely than is “reasonable and prudent” is not arbitrary.  A car is following too 
closely when it cannot reasonably stop in time to prevent a collision with the car in front 
of it.  The physics of car travel is not arbitrary.   
On the other hand, as explained by the Kolender court, the “credible and reliable” 
language regarding identification cards is arbitrary.  Nothing about the circumstances in 
which an officer would ask for identification gives guidelines to an officer to determine 
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whether a means of identification was “credible and reliable.”  Kolender is 
distinguishable.   
 Harper has failed to show that Idaho Code § 49-638(1) is void for vagueness.  The 
language is clear, provides fair notice, and is not subject to arbitrary enforcement.  In 
addition, a plethora of other jurisdictions have upheld virtually identical statutes against 
void for vagueness challenges.  Officer Cottrell had reasonable suspicion to stop Harper 
for following too closely and the district court did not err in denying Harper’s motion to 
suppress.   
2. Even If Idaho Code § 49-638(1) Is Unconstitutionally Vague, Suppression 
Is Not Warranted 
 
Idaho Code § 49-638(1) is not unconstitutionally vague.  However, even if this 
Court determines that it is, suppression is not required.  Because the district court 
determined the statute was not unconstitutionally vague, this argument was not raised 
before the district court.  “[W]here an order of the district court is correct but based upon 
an erroneous theory, this Court will affirm upon the correct theory. This doctrine is 
sometimes called the ‘right result-wrong theory’ rule.”  State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 
162 Idaho 271, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (quoting Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. 
Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 580, 850 P.2d 724, 731 (1993)); but see State v. 
Cohagan, Docket No. 44800 (August 24, 2017) (petition for rehearing pending) (court 
refused to consider correct legal theory on appeal because it was not raised below).  
Therefore, if this Court finds Idaho Code § 49-638(1) is unconstitutionally vague, it 
should still affirm the district court’s order denying suppression based upon the “right 




Under United States Supreme Court precedent, a constitutionally valid seizure is 
not rendered invalid by a subsequent determination that the law on which the seizure was 
based is unconstitutionally vague.  See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37-40 
(1979); see also United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1125 (7th Cir. 1999) (“even if 
the statute was unconstitutional as applied, suppression would not be justified because 
Trooper Lewis reasonably relied on the statute when he determined that there was a 
violation.”). 
In DeFillippo, the defendant was arrested for violating a Detroit municipal 
ordinance providing that it was “unlawful for any person [suspected of criminal activity] 
to refuse to identify himself and produce evidence of his identity.”  Id. at 33.  DeFillippo 
was charged with possession of a controlled substance recovered from a search incident 
to that arrest.  Id. at 34.  The trial court denied DeFillippo’s motion to suppress.  Id. at 34-
35.  The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the city ordinance under which 
DeFillippo had been arrested was unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, the arrest and 
the search were invalid.  Id. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Michigan Court of Appeals and 
found, “On this record there was abundant probable cause to satisfy the constitutional 
prerequisite for an arrest.”  Id. at 37.  The Court noted that, at the time of DeFillippo’s 
arrest, “there was no controlling precedent that this ordinance was or was not 
constitutional, and hence the conduct observed violated a presumptively valid ordinance.”  
Id.  “Police are charged to enforce laws until and unless they are declared 
unconstitutional.”  Id. at 38.  “Society would be ill-served if its police officers took it 
upon themselves to determine which laws are and which are not constitutionally entitled 
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to enforcement.”  Id.  The Court concluded, “The subsequently determined invalidity of 
the Detroit ordinance on vagueness grounds does not undermine the validity of the arrest 
made for violation of that ordinance, and the evidence discovered in the search of 
respondent should not have been suppressed.”  Id. at 40.   
The state acknowledges the Idaho Court of Appeals’ recent decision in State v. 
Pettit, Docket Nos. 44198/44199 (Idaho. App. Sept. 29, 2017) (petition for review 
pending), questioned the applicability of DeFillippo under the Idaho Constitution.  In 
Pettit, the Court of Appeals determined that DeFillippo did not impact the Idaho Supreme 
Court precedent interpreting the Idaho Constitution.  Here, while Harper provided a 
cursory citation to the Idaho Constitution on appeal (see Appellant’s brief, p. 8) and 
before the district court (R., p. 37), Harper’s argument is based upon the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Kolender and United States Constitution, and thus DeFillippo 
is still controlling.  Therefore, even if Idaho Code § 49-638(1) is subsequently determined 
by this Court to be unconstitutionally vague, that determination should not negate Officer 
Cottrell’s reasonable suspicion at the time of the traffic stop that Harper was violating the 
statute by following too closely.   
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Harper’s conviction.   
 DATED this 25th day of October, 2017. 
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